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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past eight years, the state of Colorado has
faced numerous lawsuits regarding the unconstitutional wait times for detainees in the criminal justice
system who suffer from mental health issues. Individuals who have been accused of crimes but have not yet
been charged wait as long as six months to receive a
court-ordered evaluation to determine mental competency before trial 1 . Those who are evaluated as mentally
incompetent face even longer waiting periods to receive
treatment at state forensic mental health hospitals. The
excessive wait times are often longer than the wait times
that detainees would need to serve if actually charged
with the alleged crime 1 . This injustice has led to many
complaints by the accused and their families and it has
sparked the advocacy group Disability Law Colorado
(DLC) to sue the state in order to mandate reform.
This research aims to investigate the reasons why federal lawsuits were brought on by the DLC against the
state of Colorado, the steps the state has taken since
the filing of the lawsuits, and the reasons for a recent
influx of people charged with crimes that require court
ordered evaluations. Further, this paper examines the
impact of the lawsuit on state litigation and thus mental institutions within the region. The state’s ability to
create effective and sustainable change for mentally
ill detainees is hindered by continued use of methods

based on precedent rather than efficacy, a phenomenon
known as path dependence. Path dependence increases
the likelihood that prolonged wait times for mentally
ill detainees will continue to go unsolved and instead
repeat in the same cyclical pattern of failing reform.
A thorough examination of how Colorado’s criminal
justice system impacts mentally ill detainees through
mental competency evaluations is a necessary addition
to current criminology literature. By addressing specific
aspects of the state of Colorado’s system, this research
can be applied to the broader context of the nation’s
criminal justice system. State comparisons have the capability to reveal approaches to reform or even demand
reform on a larger scale. Such literature can move states
and local governments away from path dependence,
thus increasing the chances of significant and lasting
reform.
2 METHODS
The research to generate this paper first explores a series
of local news articles, ranging from sources like the Denver Post to online publications of the Colorado Public
Radio. These articles were discovered from databases
such as World Access News and the criminology and
sociology database, using search terms such as “mentally ill detainees,” “Colorado criminal justice reform,”

Grace Gonzalez
“federal lawsuit,” and “mental health in the criminal
justice system.” Dates for these articles range from as
early as the initial lawsuit filed in 2011, up to the fall
of 2019. These news pieces emphasize an easily understandable outline of the basics of each lawsuit, the major
actors involved, and the consequences of their actions
in regards to the paper’s topic.
At the end of the news articles, there were often links
to more materials and the actual lawsuits mentioned in
the writing. With the use of these resources, extensive research was done to read and sort through the litigation
in chronological order, gaining a better comprehension
of how the state has reacted over the years and how
various complaints have resulted in the amending of
certain lawsuits. This resulted in findings about people
involved, such as the head of the Colorado Department
of Human Services, as well as major groups, like DLC.
These sources comprise a thorough outline of the history of this issue over the past nine years and even
before the initial lawsuit in 2011. They also yield a detailed analysis of who and what has contributed to the
prolonged wait times of mentally ill detainees.
3 FINDINGS
Under both Colorado state law and federal law, an incompetent defendant cannot stand trial. However, the
process to determine competency—a defendant’s ability to have rational understanding and consult with
the lawyer to assist in one’s own defense—is long and
complicated in and of itself1. Questions of competency
can be raised by the trial judge, prosecution, or defense,
and the court can determine a preliminary finding of
competency. This preliminary finding of competency
will be the final decision unless another party objects
within ten days 1 . In the case that another party does
object or that the court does not possess enough information to make a preliminary finding, the court orders
that a competency evaluation be carried out for the
defendant by the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS) 2 . Once again, a party has ten days from
when the evaluation report is received to request a hearing or second evaluation, and, if no case is made, then
the court’s determination of competency to stand trial
becomes final 1 .
The trial court determines where these evaluations
occur, and the defendants are often taken into custody
by the CDHS until the evaluation takes place. The evaluations happen in one of three ways: in the psychiatric hospital at the Colorado Mental Health Institute
at Pueblo (CMHIP), in the jail where the defendant is
detained by a contract evaluator hired by CMHIP, or
outside of jail for defendants released on bond 1 . If it is
decided that the defendant is not competent enough to
proceed with trial, the court can release the defendant
on bond to receive treatment services or, in the case

that the defendant is not eligible for bond, custody is
granted to the CDHS to carry out restorative treatment 1 .
Not only can the process of determining competency
take several weeks, but if the defendant is committed
to the CDHS’s control, it can take up to several months
to receive the necessary treatment due to backlogs at
CMHIP caused by insufficient space and understaffing.
Unfortunately, very little information is available as to
what exactly comprises these competency exams, and
there is not much information regarding the processes
of restoration treatment at CMHIP either, except that
services are carried out by professionals involved in
“nursing, psychology, social work and medicine.” 3 If
this information is a matter of public record, further
research should be done to understand the specifics
of these competency evaluations and restoration treatments to better hint at the nuances of the state’s issues
and why exactly the state is struggling to deliver evaluations and treatment in a timely manner.
CMHIP is a 455-bed hospital that administers inpatient behavioral health services for people involved in
the criminal justice system 3 . According to their website, CMHIP “serves individuals with pending criminal charges who require evaluations of competency,
individuals who have been found by a court to be too
incompetent to proceed (restoration treatment), and individuals found to be not guilty by reason of insanity.” 3
For having less than 500 beds, the treatment center has
a lot of responsibility to aid a very diverse group of
people involved in the criminal justice system. Much
like parole and probation, there are far too many people involved in the carceral state who require mental
health treatment compared to the small amounts of staff
and trained professionals needed to administer these required resources; the ratio of staff to patient is much too
large. Without individualized, or at least small group,
treatment with trained staff, mentally ill detainees risk
being lost in the system, rather than receiving the personal treatment they need in order to recover. Furthermore, at the time of the initial 2011 lawsuit, no Colorado jails could allocate treatment, and CMHIP was
the only state forensic mental hospital equipped to provide court-ordered evaluations and accept custody of
pretrial detainees for restorative treatment 1 . Given the
large number of individuals in need of these services,
especially in more recent years, additional pressure has
been placed on CMHIP to maintain effective staffing
and resources for these people.
In 2011, the same year the first major lawsuit was filed
against the state of Colorado, a waitlist existed of more
than 50 people waiting for admittance into CMHIP for
restorative treatment. Many of these detainees suffered
from severe mental health issues, which remained untreated for up to six months and oftentimes getting
much worse during that period 1 . Furthermore, the detainees who were not eligible for bond had to spend
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the time in local jails with a living environment that
only exacerbated their mental health problems. While
“a defendant may not be confined for restorative treatment for a period in excess of the maximum term of
confinement that could be imposed for the offense with
which the defendant is charged,” this has often been
the reality for these detainees 1 .
This backlog at CMHIP and the delays in administering competency evaluations also puts immense pressure on local sheriffs and their departments. Their jails
are left to take care of these detainees, who are often
much more difficult and expensive to jail than those
who do not suffer from mental health issues 1 . For example, the Arapahoe County Sheriff reported in 2010
that it took an average of 43 days for a competency
evaluation to be carried out in jail after the initial court
order. In 2011, the average increased to 51.6 days, with
it once taking more than eight weeks—58 days, to be exact—for a detainee to receive the evaluation 1 . The Arapahoe Sheriff also saw delays for admission to CMHIP
after finding incompetency, with an average wait time
of 26.25 days from the court order for commitment to
actual admission to the institute in 2010, and an increase
to 32.5 days in 2011 1 . These detainees’ presence in local
jails exhausts much of the jails’ resources meant for the
other incarcerated individuals, like those serving short
sentences or those awaiting trial who do not have mental health issues, and it costs significantly more money
to jail those suffering from mental illness. The price to
house one inmate for a day at the Arapahoe County
Detention Facility is $68.30, but, to house a mentally ill
detainee, that price doubles 1 . Local jails are having to
incur these costs more often than they should due to
the state’s failure in timely admittance of detainees for
their evaluations and treatment.
Even though the primary lawsuits examined in this
paper are between DLC and the state of Colorado,
the persistent problems regarding mistreatment of detainees, prolonged wait times, and understaffing in
treatment facilities manifested long before DLC’s original 2011 lawsuit. In 1999, for example, the first sign of
systemic failure was revealed through the Neiberger
federal lawsuit, in which patients at CMHIP filed complaints for negligence in the facility as well as violations
of their due process 4 . This led to a 2002 settlement that
resulted in the CDHS agreeing to fill vacant staff positions and maintain staffing ratios at CMHIP, as understaffing was found to be one of the main causes of
mistreatment at the institute 2 .
Further showing the history of incompetency by the
state was the Zuniga case, which occurred just four
years later. The CDHS had to answer a citation by a Denver District judge for failing to admit pretrial detainees
for competency evaluations and restorative treatment
in a timely manner 2 . In fact, by the end of 2006, around
85 people were waiting to be transported to CMHIP for

treatment 1 . The Department “blamed staffing shortages
and increased numbers of court referrals as the cause
for delays,” clearly showing that the settlement for the
Neiberger case was ineffective in rectifying staffing issues 2 . The state refused to change their ways, and instead they demonstrated path dependency by maintaining their traditional procedures. In 2009, the agreement reached by the Zuniga settlement expired with
the opening of more than 200 additional beds on the
CMHIP campus 2 . However, as similarly demonstrated
by mass incarceration, the creation of more beds often
leads to the automatic filling of those beds to reduce
backlog, rather than actually addressing the underlying
factors creating the problem. When the new forensic
institute was added to the CMHIP campus, it had the
opposite effect of reducing backlog and instead created
even longer delays to receive treatment at the facility.
This was due to the fact that the institute was never
properly staffed from its creation and not prepared to
receive the high volume of court referrals 2 . By January
of 2010, pretrial detainees once again suffered the violation of constitutional rights when significant delays
became the norm 1 .
In 2011, DLC finally got involved to address the
mounting backlogs by filing a lawsuit against the state
of Colorado. DLC “protects and promotes the rights of
people with disabilities and older people in Colorado
through direct legal representation, advocacy, education and legislative analysis.” 5 Because these unconstitutional wait times were greatly affecting people with
mental health issues and even making their illnesses
worse, DLC believed it was their responsibility to become a driving force of reform.
The group filed the original federal lawsuit on August 31, 2011, naming Reggie Bicha, the Executive Director of the CDHS, and Teresa Bernal, the Interim Superintendent of CMHIP, as the defendants 1 . At the time,
DLC went by the name “The Legal Center for People
with Disabilities and Older People,” and as such the
lawsuit’s title was abbreviated to Center for Legal Advocacy v. Bicha 5 . In the lawsuit, DLC argued that the
pretrial detainees, “who have been charged with but
not convicted of crimes, have constitutionally protected
liberty interests in promptly receiving such evaluations
and treatment while not being confined any longer than
necessary.” 1 They cited that, in the most severe cases,
some detainees have waited for treatment for as long
as half a year 1 . These excessive wait times violate the
United States Constitution by depriving individuals of
their due process rights and taking advantage of people
who are often unable to protect themselves 1 . Detainees
are also guaranteed the right to a speedy trial under
the Sixth Amendment, but the state of Colorado’s own
speedy trial statute excludes the time that is spent to
evaluate detainees’ competency, meaning they could
be forced to wait for an indefinite amount of time for
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evaluations or treatment without technically being in
violation of the statute 1 .
In addition to outlining the major issues and key actors, the lawsuit also included descriptions of many
individual cases, emphasizing the exact wait times detainees suffered and demonstrating their breech in constitutional rights. For example, Client L.E., who at the
time was represented by the Colorado Public Defender,
was ordered to receive a competency evaluation by
Judge D. Archuleta on December 30, 2010. It wasn’t
until almost a month later, on January 28, 2011, that
the evaluation occurred at the Boulder County Jail. Another ten days passed before L.E.’s evaluation was filed
with the court on February 7, 2011, and on February
14, the court finally determined L.E. was too incompetent to proceed with trial and required transportation
to CMHIP for restoration. Client L.E. waited more than
five months before finally being transported to CMHIP
on July 15, 2011 1 . L.E. is just one of countless examples,
and many more instances of injustice were included as
evidence in DLC’s complaint against the state.
Center for Legal Advocacy v. Bicha ultimately resulted in a settlement agreement in 2012 between the
CDHS and DLC. The main condition of the agreement
required the CDHS to file monthly reports with DLC,
demonstrating that they were fulfilling the agreed upon
28-day timeline to complete competency evaluations 2 .
DLC adopted a monitoring role to ensure the CDHS
followed all procedures and remained in conjunction
with their agreed upon provisions. For the first two
years following the settlement, the state managed to
timely admit pretrial detainees for their court-ordered
evaluations 2 . Additionally, the Office of Behavioral
Health at the CDHS created a jail-based evaluation and
restoration program in 2013, designed to “[provide]
daily psychiatric care and competency restoration treatment through individual and group sessions; structured
similarly to services provided at the Colorado Mental
Health Institute at Pueblo (CMHIP).” 6 The program
is also designed to “routinely [assess] for goodness of
fit and [transfer] [individuals] to a hospital setting if
necessary.” 6
However, in 2015, the CDHS once again began facing
issues concerning their treatment of mentally ill detainees. The admissions policy to CMHIP was changed
by the CDHS without the knowledge of DLC, and these
new policies limited the number of those admitted to
the facility 2 . This produced a waitlist and generated
another backlog of approximately 100 detainees who
were determined incompetent and awaiting treatment
at the center. As was the case with the Zuniga lawsuit, the CDHS once again cited staffing shortages and
a spike in the number of referrals as the main causes
of the backlog 2 . By using the same excuses, the state
admitted to their lack of action and response to the
previous lawsuits, further showing the effects of path

dependency. These actions were a breach of the settlement agreement, but rather than reaching out to DLC
and explaining the situation, the CDHS tried to cover
up their mistakes by submitting inaccurate reports to
DLC 2 . These falsified reports made it appear as though
the CDHS was still following the 28-day admissions
deadline when they were not. DLC discovered and began investigating the CDHS’s actions “when it started
receiving complaints from detainees’ families and their
attorneys who were being told by jail staff that it will
be months before admission to CMHIP.” 2
In 2016, DLC reopened the 2011 lawsuit to once again
address these backlogs. Both parties agreed to modify
the settlement agreement by appointing “an independent administrator to supervise future compliance.” 7
The independent administrator’s job, much like DLC
did previously, was to monitor the CDHS’s actions
very closely over the next two and a half years to ensure it followed procedure ? . The administrator would
have access to the CDHS’s operations as well as coordinate meetings each quarter to check the Department’s progress 2 . However, DLC tried to monitor the
CDHS previously and the state was still able to falsify
reports. To have an independent administrator do the
same work would likely not have a more effective outcome.
In response to the outcry from DLC in 2016, state
officials sought help from lawmakers to give them additional time frames beyond the previously-agreed upon
28-day deadline. The state asked for 45 days, starting
from the moment a person is booked into jail, to execute mental competency evaluations, as well as 150
days to treat individuals who are found to be incompetent 8 . Both of these wait times are excessive, especially
when many of the detainees face charges with jail times
that are less than those deadlines. Reggie Bicha, the
Executive Director of the CDHS who was named as a
defendant in the original 2011 lawsuit, claimed “it’s a
matter of skyrocketing numbers of people who need
mental health treatment in jail.” 8 Regardless, these requests showed the state’s desire to change only the bare
minimum in order to avoid penalties through litigation,
rather than abandoning path dependency to seek the
necessary broader reform.
Officials are also looking for alternative solutions that
involve treating mental health detainees while they are
in jail 8 . However, besides the jail-based restoration program created in 2013, which is located at the Arapahoe
County Detention Facility, CMHIP is the only facility
designed to provide treatment that restores incompetent detainees 1 . Other jails do not have the capacity to
treat inmates, and would end up using all their valuable
resources on mentally ill detainees as opposed to the
other inmates, who also need assistance. Not surprisingly, mental health advocates and public defenders
such as DLC are not supportive of mentally ill people
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receiving treatment in jail 8 . They argue that the most
effective and beneficial form of treatment is in a community mental health care system, outside the adverse
effects of the carceral state. Furthermore, advocates also
oppose the state’s proposition of a 150-day timeframe to
administer treatment. They say the roughly five-month
wait is “too long to sit in jail—and perhaps even be
forcibly medicated—without being convicted of anything.” 8
There is no denying that the number of court-ordered
mental evaluations has drastically increased over the
past two decades. In 2001, 429 people were reported
to receive mental health competency evaluations, compared to 2,277 evaluations in 2017 8 . While the data substantiates this fact, it is much harder to determine what
has led to this increase in court orders. Although anyone in the court room can call into question a defendant’s competency, it is the judge who holds the power
to determine who does and does not require an evaluation. Robert Werthwein, the Director of the Office
of Behavioral Health during the reopening of the lawsuit in 2016, believes part of the solution lies in judicial
discretion. He proposes that judges should more carefully consider who does and does not require inpatient
services based on the severity of offenders’ mental illness 8 . If judges contemplate releasing more low-level
offenders out of jail to receive outpatient treatment, this
would allow more space within inpatient centers, like
CMHIP, for the most severe cases. This is similar to
Christopher Seeds’ theoretical concept of bifurcation,
where low-level offenders are treated differently from
more serious offenders 9 . This method should also help
clear some of the backlog in local jails and allow for
better allocation of state resources. To help spread this
message, Werthwein sent several letters a week to local
judges to help sway their opinions. He mentioned that
some took notice, but it would take a lot more support
for the movement to foster significant change 10 .
On June 13, 2018, attorneys working for DLC once
again moved to reopen the 2012 class-action settlement
to address the unconstitutional wait times faced by detainees expecting competency evaluations 7 . This time,
the complaint cited that “the wait times bear no relationship to the offenses these individuals have been charged
with, which are often low-level and non-violent. . . The
result of these lengthy, unconstitutional delays is a vicious cycle. The longer the state makes these individuals
wait for evaluation and restorative services, the more
exacerbated their mental illnesses become.” 11 As officials stated, requests for competency evaluations have
increased 524% since the year 2000, and in that time
demands for mental health treatment by detainees have
increased by 931% 11 . Once again, the CDHS failed to
enact change and faces the same issue of people waiting
months in jail for competency evaluations or treatment,
even though they have not yet been convicted of any

crimes. Reggie Bicha was again named in the lawsuit,
and he proposed a bill to the state legislature that gives
the state “permission to treat mentally ill people in jail,
rather than move them to a mental hospital or other
treatment setting.” 11 However, the bill died on the last
day of the legislative session, to DLC’s relief.
In late 2018, DLC created a motion for the appointment of a Special Master to address their concerns. Special Masters are officials appointed by a judge to oversee that judicial orders are carried out and to provide
evidence and recommendations to the judge for how
to best deal with the matter 12 . In the defendants’ response to the motion, both Reggie Bicha and Jill Marshall, the Superintendent of CMHIP, agreed that a Special Master would be valuable “to assist the Department
in implementing its plan to address compliance with
the Settlement Agreement timeframes concerning inpatient competency restoration treatment and to assist
the Court in addressing the complex and technical issues in this case.” 13 On December 29, 2018, Judge Nina
Wang, a United States Magistrate Judge of the District
of Colorado, ordered the appointment of Groundswell
Services, Inc., a small management and consulting firm
in Denver, to fulfill the Special Masters role. Bicha and
Marshall requested that the Court’s appointment of Special Master continue “until the Department has maintained compliance with the Settlement Agreement timeframes concerning inpatient competency restoration
services for three months.” 13
For their first duty as Special Masters, Groundswell
Services, Inc. filed a report on January 28, 2019, to outline their review of the CDHS document titled, “Comprehensive Plan for Compliance,” which “describes the
efforts of CDHS to improve timely performance of competency services, and thereby comply with the timelines delineated in the 2016 Settlement Agreement.” 13
In the Special Masters report, Groundswell Services,
Inc. provides feedback on the CDHS’s plan and recommends how they might change it to become more
effective. They start by stating their belief that “most
mental health services are best delivered in a broad system of care, beginning in the community, rather than
solely in inpatient psychiatric hospitals.” 14 They argue
that all members of the Settlement Agreement can agree
that this would be the ideal solution.
The CDHS has been struggling with this same problem for many years, and despite DLC’s involvement
in reopening cases and continually suing the state, it
has been to little avail. DLC and many other health and
advocacy programs contest that the best way to support
and treat mentally ill detainees is not by spending unnecessary time in jail awaiting treatment; instead, these
individuals should receive services from community resources. With these services they can remain integrated
into society and thus escape the inherently adverse effects of the carceral state.
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One such community treatment program was started
in November 2019 by the Mental Health Center of Denver, “one of the city’s biggest community behavioral
health care providers.” 15 The program, called Community Based Enhanced Restoration, is designed to allow
patients to “live independently or with family members, and case managers will see them at lease three
times a week to help connect them and transport them
to services from Mental Health Center of Denver and
other providers, including benefits, employment, education, psychiatry and medication management.” 15
The program is capped at 30 but, if it is successful, the
supervisor of the program hopes to create similar programs elsewhere. While supportive of the outpatient
treatment plan, DLC’s director of legal services, Alison Butler, says that the difficulty with getting these
kinds of outpatient programs off the ground is having
clients to generate funding, but in order to have clients,
the program needs referrals from judges 15 . Judges will
likely only refer to the program if it has proven to be
successful in the past, so it becomes evident that this cycle poses a major hurdle to the success of these types of
programs. As Robert Werthwein previously suggested,
the solution likely lies in the discretion and decisions of
judges.
Contrary to outpatient treatment programs, some
people still advocate that the most obvious fix is to increase the number of beds available at CMHIP so that
patients can be treated immediately, instead of waiting in jail for restoration. In fact, CDHS announced in
September 2019 that a new unit is being constructed
at CMHIP, which will add 24 beds and is projected to
open by November 2020 16 . This construction is part of
a larger plan to add a total of 128 beds by December
2021, including 18 beds at a new jail-based restoration
services location at the Boulder County Jail, and 44 beds
for restoration treatment at the Colorado Mental Health
Institute at Fort Logan (CMHIFL), which is traditionally for civil patients 16 . However, as the Neiberger case
showed previously, increasing the number of beds does
nothing without also being prepared to increase staffing
and resources to adequately house those beds, which
the state failed to do after the 2002 lawsuit. Considering that the CDHS’s latest plan to increase beds does
not mention anything about how this additional unit
will be staffed, it can only be hoped that the proposed
$7 million budget includes a corresponding increase in
staffing and resources to prevent the ongoing systemic
failures seen in the past. As construction of these new
units continues in the future, it will be interesting to
see if they have the intended effect of reducing backlog,
or if, yet again, the issue of additional beds without
additional staffing persists.
Another proposed solution is to open bed space in
civil mental health hospitals, which the state has already begun 14 . In other words, beds for non-criminally

involved patients at mental hospitals would be reserved
specifically to address the backlog of detainees awaiting
trial. In December 2018, the CDHS announced a freeze
on civil admissions to CMHIFL, meaning patients not
involved in the criminal justice system were not able
to receive treatment 17 . DLC’s Alison Butler said she
was “dismayed by the state’s proposal,” claiming that
the plan meant, “essentially, in order to get. . . inpatient
mental health services you have to commit a crime.” 17
The state was attempting to solve one problem by creating another. Not surprisingly, this proposal was met
with severe backlash, both because it inhibited patients
who were not involved in the criminal justice system
from seeking treatment and it appeared to award or
incentivize criminal behavior. Only two months later
in February 2019, the state agreed to remove the freeze
and once again allow civil patients to be admitted for
the treatment they need 18 .
Ultimately, a lasting solution to this problem is far
more complicated than increasing the number of beds
or appointing a Special Master to observe obedience. As
Groundswell Services, Inc.’s January 2019 report noted,
the CDHS’s plan to come “promptly into compliance
with the Settlement Agreement is not the same as a comprehensive plan to improve Colorado’s civil and forensic mental health services.” 13 For the state to finally
fulfill consistent and reliable compliance, the broader
healthcare system must be reformed. In March 2019, a
consent decree was filed in federal court to close the
most recent lawsuit between DLC and the CDHS and
attempt to create a comprehensive plan to address the
backlog of those waiting for competency evaluations
once and for all 19 . The agreement “sets up a complex series of staggered timeframes for admission to state-run,
inpatient treatment. . . [allowing] CDHS to prioritize the
most acutely ill patients by requiring CDHS to admit
them for restoration treatment more quickly.” 19 If the
state fails to meet any of these deadlines within a 12month period, it faces a maximum of $10 million in
fines, which would be used to “enhance community
mental health services.” 19 Additionally, the agreement
promises to “implement a coordinated wide-scale outpatient community restoration program,” create a team
to manage data to make better informed decisions, and
increase training and uniformity for competency evaluators and evaluations 19 .
While the agreement sounds hopeful on paper, especially with the mention of a comprehensive reform plan,
the families of mental health patients suffering in the
system know all too well that a huge gap exists between
claims of action and finally delivering those promises.
For years, these previous lawsuits have led to the state’s
assurance that changes will be made to the system and,
for years, mental health patients and their families have
been let down by the state’s failures. Path dependency
has resulted in the state doing the bare minimum to
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meet terms of various agreements for short-term, immediate fixes after lawsuits and sanctions force the state’s
hand. Lasting reform, however, requires a much more
extensive evaluation of how mental health patients receive treatment and how they are addressed within the
criminal justice system. Hopefully, this newest plan can
initiate lasting reform, but the last decade suggests that
will not be the case.
4 CONCLUSION
A long history exists of the failed reforms and continual
efforts of DLC to create lasting change in the way the
state treats detainees who suffer from mental illness. As
presented in the research, it is clear that the CDHS and
CMHIP have, in the past, refused to change their methods and instead only try to escape impending penalties
and lawsuits when they arise.
Ultimately, the situation in Colorado is not unique;
it represents a broader failure of the criminal justice
system, which remains rooted in old procedures and
mindsets instead of welcoming the possibility of reform. Scholar Katherine Beckett refers to this path dependency as “the tendency for courses of political or
social development to ‘generate self-reinforcing processes’ that frustrate efforts to change direction.” 20 One
of these self-reinforcing processes in Colorado’s case is
the state’s automatic filling of additional hospital beds,
without ever addressing the underlying problem producing the backlog. When they open more beds under
the assumption that it will fix the issue, they neglect to
consider the lack of staffing and other resources that are
also necessary, which only contributes to the problem.
Another example of a positive feedback mechanism
in Colorado is when the courts order excessive inpatient restoration in the first place. As the research outlines at the beginning of this paper, the process to determine competency is complicated, but it is also the
method that has been used for years. If courts started
to reconsider who really requires state mandated inpatient restorative treatment and instead examine who
would benefit from outpatient treatment, the numbers
of detainees waiting for admittance to CMHIP would
decrease. However, the state has only ever reacted to
mental health service in one way, and to change it comprehensively, as the Special Master and DLC suggest,
would be very difficult. Too much history, money, and
too many resources have been devoted to the system as
it currently exists, and path dependence stands in the
way of reform.
Furthermore, Colorado’s situation exacerbates Beckett’s concept of the carceral state 20 . When these detainees are locked in jail for excessive amounts of time,
they not only experience adverse effects on their mental health, but they are also cut off from society. The
longer they wait in jail for evaluations or treatment, the

more detached they become from a normal, functioning,
anti-crime life. Their involvement in the carceral state
reduces their chances of success and reintegration into
society after receiving the restoration treatment they
need. This is why DLC advocates for more communitybased treatment services, which would allow offenders to interact with their families and sometimes even
keep their jobs, rather than the inpatient forensic mental
health hospital at CMHIP. Unfortunately, creating these
community services requires even more resources that
the state does not possess. However, if the state developed a new mindset open to changing the traditional
pathways to restoration, they could consider reallocating funds dedicated to building more units at CMHIP
that are focused on new outpatient treatment programs
instead.
There are a few negative feedback loops present in
the case of Colorado, and, as Beckett explains these
mechanisms, they might provide some hope for lasting
reform 20 . One of these negative feedback loops is discussed thoroughly in Hadar Aviram’s book Cheap on
Crime. The impending fiscal costs of a broken system,
especially after the 2008 recession, have left many states
forced to make reforms for the sole purpose of saving
money 21 . For Colorado, the fiscal disadvantages are
evident in local sheriff departments and county jails,
where it costs substantially more to detain mental health
patients than other detainees. Costs are also high to
maintain CMHIP, which caused the understaffing that
contributed to the backlogs in the first place. Furthermore, the state faces many sanctions for the various
lawsuits and decrees that are designed to compel the
state to fix the issues. Even with these negative feedback
loops, however, costs have not deterred the state in the
past, and path dependency suggests that costs will not
incite reform in the future, either.
5 FURTHER DIRECTIONS
If Colorado hopes to create consistent and lasting reform, it must approach mental health and the criminal justice system in a broader way, addressing all
aspects of the system rather than focusing on minor
changes designed to mitigate consequences of past mistakes. The focus needs to be placed on revising mental
health institutions as a whole, starting by creating more
community-based programs, as opposed to just complying with the Settlement Agreement. This mirrors
Christopher Seeds’ discussion of recent criminal justice reforms and how they require a comprehensive
plan 9 . This “comprehensive approach” to reform requires participation from all parties involved, bipartisan support in government, empirical evidence, and
a mindset ready to finally abandon path dependency.
This would include judges who, rather than sending all
mentally ill detainees to CMHIP by default, would use
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discretion to determine which low-level offenders could
be directed towards outpatient treatment instead. This
comprehensive approach would also involve funds being directed towards creating outpatient services rather
than being funneled back into building more beds at
CMHIP. Only then can Colorado—and the criminal justice system as a whole—hope to improve the lives of
those involved in the carceral state and establish meaningful reform. Future research should not only address
the most recent activity regarding the lawsuits against
the state of Colorado, but it should also study the actions taken by lawmakers and other advocacy groups
like DLC to initiate reform. It is important to ask which
reforms, if any, have been successful and why. It is arguably more imperative to ask which reforms have
failed, why they failed, and what actions can be taken
differently in the future in order to be successful.
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